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THE COMPENSABILITY OF MENTALLY INDUCED
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES UNDER TEXAS
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
RICHARD E. SAMES

The concept of compensation for work related accidents and diseases has
undergone a major change in recent years. In many jurisdictions, workers'
compensation awards are now granted for psychiatric disorders attributable to employment related pressures and emotional stresses., Frequently,
the causal relationship between the hazards of employment and the disability is obscure.' The issue is not merely one of legal line drawing, but a
larger and more difficult problem of reconciling the work related injury
theory of workers' compensation with the social and moral issue of a disabled member of society. 3 A 1971 amendment to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act 4 has raised a number of questions concerning recovery for
mentally induced occupational diseases under Texas law. The following
discussion will attempt to analyze that amendment in light of the efforts
toward more liberal compensation in other jurisdictions and the Texas
decisions before and after the amendment.
1. See, e.g., Baker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 96 Cal. Rptr. 279, 285 (Ct.
App. 1971); Royal State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Appeal Bd., 487 P.2d 278,
282 (Hawaii 1971); Carter v. General Motors Corp., 106 N.W.2d 105, 110 (Mich. 1960). The
term "workmen's" has been changed to "workers' in the Texas statute. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 8306b, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
2. Compare Deziel v. Difco Laboratories, Inc., 232 N.W.2d 146, 151-52 (Mich. 1975)
(employee's subjective perception of work environment determines causation) with Brill &
Glass, Workmen's Compensation for PsychiatricDisorders, 193 J.A.M.A. 345, 345-46 (1965)

(only objective stress should be considered since no job is stress free and compensating for
subjective stresses will lead to compensating all psychological maladies). "[Tihe complex
etiology of psychoneuroses . . .are such that . . .a psychiatrist will be unable to estimate

with any degree of accuracy the probabilities of the injury occurring in the absence of employment. . . .In such cases, the causation requirement . . .is of little assistance in deciding
whether to award compensation." Comment, Workmen's CompensationAwards for Psychoneurotic Reactions, 70 YALE L.J. 1129, 1142-43 (1961).
3. See Brill & Glass, Workmen's Compensationfor PsychiatricDisorders, 193 J.A.M.A.

345, 347 (1965).
[E]xtension of the benefits of the compensation system to all sick or injured employees . .

.

.would make workmen's compensation into something never contemplated

and would violate completely the basic principle that the expense of work injuries are
to be a part of the cost of production. However, if we are to approach that result
inevitably .. .perhaps the time has come when we must answer certain questions
frankly-notably, the question whether we actually intend to make industry pay for
all disabilities of employees regardless of fault, and if so, under what rules, and subject
to what limitations.
Id. at 347.
4. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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BASIC THEORY OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION

Workers' compensation is a "mechanism for providing cash-wage benefits and medical care to victims of work connected injuries and for placing
the cost of these injuries ultimately on the consumer, through the medium
of insurance, whose premiums are passed on in the cost of the product." 5
Statutes generally reflect this theory of compensation by requiring that an
injury or occupational disease arise "out of and in the course of employment."' This phrase frequently is discussed in terms of "risk," and a given
injury is considered to have arisen "out of and in the course of employment" when the employment situation creates a risk that the injury will
occur.7 Another common statutory provision excludes from compensation
"[o]rdinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside
of employment." 8 Clearly, diseases which are characteristic of life in general involve no risk arising from employment and are not within the in5. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1, at 1 (1978). But see Hender-

son, Should Workmen's Compensation Be Extended to NonoccupationalInjuries?, 48 TEXAS
L. REV. 117, 119 (1969) (proposal for compensating all injuries regardless of work connection).
6. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 25, § 25-5-1(9) (1977); ARiz. REV. STAT. § 23-1021 (1971); TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1978). The first part of the clause "arise
out of employment" is said to deal with cause and origin, and the second, "in the course of
employment," with the place and time of the accident. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION, §§ 6 at 3-1, 14 at 4-1 (1978).
In practice, the "course of employment" and "arising out of employment" tests are

not, and should not be, applied entirely independently; they are both parts of a single
test of work-connection, and therefore deficiencies in the strength of one factor are
sometimes allowed to be made up by the strength in the other.
Id. § 29 at 5-295.
7. See Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 111, 246 S.W. 72, 74
(1922); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). "The crucial issue is the kind or quality of risk which employment must create in order
to satisfy the minimum requirement of legal causatiori." Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards for PsychoneuroticReactions, 70 YALE L.J. 1129, 1141 (1961).
Originally the courts applied a "peculiar or increased risk" doctrine, which required that
the risk created by the employment be greater than that to which the employee was subjected
in everyday life. This restrictive doctrine was supplanted by the "actual risk" doctrine which
inquires whether the risk is in fact related to the employment, regardless of whether it is
common to the public. Professor Larson also cites a third doctrine, that of "positional risk,"
which is used by a few courts. This doctrine determines whether the employment placed the
employee in position to sustain the disability. See 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION, § 6 at 3-1 to 3-5 (1978).

Evidence that Texas has adopted the "actual risk" position is found in Garcia v. Texas
Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 413, 419, 209 S.W.2d 333, 337 (1948). The rationale of this doctrine
is that "[t]he risk may be no different in degree than those to which he may be exposed
outside of his employment. The injury is compensable, not because of the extent or particular
character of the hazard, but because it exists as one of the conditions of employment." Id. at
417, 209 S.W.2d at 337 (quoting Savage v. St. Aeden's Church, 189 A. 599, 601 (Conn: 1937)).
8. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1978); see 1A A. LARSON, THE
LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 41.33, at 7-267 (1973).
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tended range of compensability. Workers' compensation is intended to
compensate employees for work related injuries, but compensation where
the only proof is that there was a change in the employee's physical or
mental makeup while on the job goes beyond such intent.10 "The Legislature," it is observed, "has not provided health insurance."I" Thus the issue
of compensability, due to the purpose of workers' compensation and the
statutory definitions of compensable injuries, is inextricably connected
with the question of causation."
TEXAS LAW

The Texas Workers' Compensation Act originally applied only to accidental injuries and such diseases or infections as naturally resulted therefrom."3 In 1947 the Texas Legislature formally recognized that illness, as
well as injury, could result from industrial hazards by amending the act
to provide compensation for a specific and exclusive list of occupational
diseases. '"
Thus, after 1947 there existed two distinct classifications of injuries for
which a disabled employee could be compensated: accidental injuries and
occupational disease. 5 An accidental injury required an undesigned, untoward event which could be traced to a definite time, place, and cause.
9. In Mueller v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 533 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976,
writ refd n.r.e.), the court relied upon the statutory exclusion as indicative of "a Legislative
intent to require evidence of probative force of a causal connection between employment and
occupational diseases."
10. Northern Assurance Co. of America v. Taylor, 540 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In connection with heart attack cases, Professor
Larson has stated:
Obviously if the heart attack is a genuinely work-connected injury, to deny compensation benefits would be a gross violation of the legislative purpose and of the workman's
rights. It is equally obvious that under the coverage clause . . .(arising out of and in
the course of employment), compensation cannot be paid for every heart attack which
happens to make its appearance during working hours.
Larson, The "Heart Cases" in Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis and Suggested
Solution, 65 MICH. L. REv. 441, 441 (1967).
11. Northern Assurance Co. of America v. Taylor, 540 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); accord, Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Biber, 146
S.W.2d 442, 443 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940, writ dism'd judgmt cor.).
12. See Mueller v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 533 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1976, writ refd n.r.e.); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
13. 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 103, Part IV § 1, at 291.
14. See 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 113, §§ 2-9, at 176-80.
15. See Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. McKay, 146 Tex. 569, 573, 210 S.W.2d 147, 150
(1948) (accidental injury); Rudd v. Gulf Cas. Co., 257 S.W.2d 809, 811-12 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1953, no writ) (occupational disease).
16. See, e.g., Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859, 859 (Tex. 1972);
Northern Assurance Co. of America v. Taylor, 540 S.W.2d 832, 833 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Consolidated Underwriters v. Wright, 408 S.W.2d
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An accident per se was not required, but there must have been an event
which, although not occurring in the normal course of employment, was a
risk thereof.17 An occupational disease, on the other hand, was acquired in
the usual and ordinary course of employment. 8 Occupational diseases developed gradually and their inception was untraceable except as an incident to the pursuit of an occupation."9
Until 1971 compensation for occupational diseases was limited to diseases specifically enumerated in the statute." All unlisted diseases went
without compensation unless they satisfied the requirements of an accidental injury." In 1971 the Texas Legislature, in an effort to "make all
diseases arising out of employment compensable,' ' 2 amended the Workers'
Compensation Act, repealing the specific list of occupational diseases and
substituting in its place a broad definition of the term.23
140, 148 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
17. See Northern Assurance Co. of America v. Taylor, 540 S.W.2d 832, 833 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Mincey, 255
S.W.2d 262, 269 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1953, writ refd n.r.e.).
18. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McFarland, 433 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Frazier v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 368 S.W.2d 955, 959
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1963, writ refd n.r.e.).
19. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McFarland, 433 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ refd n.r.e.); Frazier v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 368 S.W.2d 955,
959 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Solomon v. Massachusetts Bonding &
Ins. Co., 347 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1961, writ ref'd).
20. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McFarland, 433 S.W.2d 534, 536.(Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1968, writ refd n.r.e.); 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 113, §§ 2-9, at 176-80.
21. In Frazier v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 368 S.W.2d 955, 959 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1963, writ refd n.r.e.), the court found that the claimant had in fact suffered an occupational
disease, but denied compensation since the disease was unscheduled and could not be fit into
the accidental injury category.
22. Terry, Occupational Disease & Cumulative Injury, 8 TRIAL L.F. 3, 3 (April-June
1974) (quoting Tex. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary, Report on S.B. 265, 62nd LEG. 4 (1971)).
23. The amended statute, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1978),
provides:
Wherever the terms "Injury" or "Personal Injury" are used in the Workmen's
Compensation Laws of this State, such terms shall . . . mean damage or harm to the
physical structure of the body and such diseases or infections as naturally result therefrom . . .[and] . . .include "Occupational Diseases ... ""Occupational Disease"
• . .shall be construed to mean any disease arising out of and in the course of employment which causes damage or harm to the physical structure of the body and such
other diseases or infections as naturally result therefrom. An "Occupational Disease"
shall also include damage or harm to the physical structure of the body occurring as
the result of repetitious physical traumatic activities extending over a period of time
and arising in the course of employment; provided, that the date of the cumulative
injury shall be the date disability was caused thereby. Ordinary diseases of life to
which the general public is exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except where such diseases follow as an incident to an "Occupational Disease"
or "Injury" as defined in this section.
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The amendment defines occupational disease as "any disease arising out
of and in the course of employment which causes damage or harm to the
physical structure of the body." 4 Additionally, damage or harm to the
physical structure of the body resulting from "repetitious physical traumatic activities extending over a period of time and arising in the course
of employment," is included in the definition. 25 Ordinary diseases of life,
however, remain uncompensable. 1
The amended definition in section 20 of article 8306 raises a number of
questions regarding occupational disease coverage as well as the continued
viability of the distinction between accidental injury and occupational
disease. The definition of "injury" which courts previously interpreted to
mean accidental injury, as distinguished from occupational disease, now
includes occupational diseases arising out of employment."7 It has been
suggested that this synthesis of cumulative injury or occupational disease"
and a sudden injury which is accidental in nature into the single term
"injury" has rendered the distinction between the two terms obsolete. 29
The observation is not unfounded. Its basis lies in the contention that it is
not the cause of the claimant's injury that is important, so long as it is work
related, but it is the disabling effect of the injury that gives rise to compensation. +° Under this analysis, however, compensation for injuries will go far
beyond what has heretofore been allowed in Texas, and in the majority of
state jurisdictions. 3 Therefore, the changes deserve close scrutiny to determine legislative intent.12 The amendment clearly was enacted to expand
recovery for occupational diseases,3 but precisely what the legislature
meant by the terms "arising out of and in the course of employment," 3'
and "occurring as the result of repetitious physical traumatic activity"35
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. As occupational diseases are of a gradually developing nature the terms occupational
disease and cumulative injury are used interchangeably herein.
29. See Terry, OccupationalDisease & Cumulative Injury, 8 TRIAL L.F. 3, 3 (April-June
1974).
30. See id. at 4.
31. See, e.g., Lawson v. Employers Ins., 330 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); Verdugo
v. Industrial Comm'n, 561 P.2d 1249, 1250 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); Erhart v. Great W. Sugar

Co., 546 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Mont. 1976). See also 1A A.

LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S

§ 42.23, at 7-373 (1973).
32. A number of writers have already discussed the statute. See Sartwelle, Workmen's
Compensation,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 183, 184 (1975); Terry, Occupational
Disease & Cumulative Injury, 8 TRIAL L.F. 3, 3 (April-June 1974); 9 Hous. L. REV. 597, 599
(1972).
33. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
34. TEx. REV. Cnr. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
35. Id.
COMPENSATION
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is subject to controversy." This is particularly true in the area of mental
disabilities.
MENTAL CAUSE AND INJURY IN TEXAS

In the area of mental trauma and injury, there are three categories of
compensable injury in Texas:37 physical trauma causing mental injuries,"
mental trauma causing physical injuries,39 and mental trauma causing
mental injuries.'" Although a number of jurisdictions have been reluctant
to allow compensation in the latter category, 4 Texas was one of the forerunners in the field.42 In Bailey v. American General Insurance Co.,43 the
Texas Supreme Court held that traumatic neurosis resulting from an emotional stimulus which was produced by an incident involving a risk or
hazard of employment constituted damage to the physical structure of the
body. 4
Texas was thus a leader in allowing compensation for injuries involving
both a mental cause and a mental effect. Nevertheless, Bailey and its
progeny have retained some limitations on recovery in such cases. Since
Bailey, disabilities associated with mental or psychological causes have
been compensable, but only as accidental injuries.'" As such they must be
traceable to a definite time, place, and cause. Occupational diseases for
which recovery has been allowed, on the other hand, have all been physi36. See Sartwelle, Workmen's Compensation,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J.
183, 184 (1975); Terry, Occupational Disease & Cumulative Injury, 8 TRIAL L.F. 3, 3 (AprilJune 1974).
37. The categories are suggested by Professor Larson. See 1A A. LARsoN, THE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.20, at 7-348 (1973).
38. Hood v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522, 527, 209 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tex. 1948)
(neurosis resulting from injuries to foot and elbow); Miller Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ochoa, 432
S.W.2d 118, 122 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (conversion reaction
from eight foot fall from airplane wing).
39. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169, 177 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (stroke suffered by storekeeper after being severely berated by customer).
40. Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 436-38, 279 S.W.2d 315, 321-22 (1955)
(traumatic neurosis after seeing fellow worker plunge to death from scaffolding).
41. See 1A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.23, at 7-373 (1973)
(survey of case law in the area).
42. Professor Larson called the Bailey case the "most significant case yet to appear on
the subject of 'nervous' injury." 1A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.23,
at 7-377 (1973); see Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 436-38, 279 S.W.2d 315,
321-22 (1955).
43. 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955).
44. Id. at 434-38, 279 S.W.2d at 318-22.
45. Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Tex. 1972). "[Clases
allowing recovery for . . . traumatic neurosis have involved particular events." Id. at 860.
46. See, e.g., Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859, 859 (Tex. 1972);
Northern Assurance Co. of America v. Taylor, 540 S.W.2d 832, 833 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1976, writ refd n.r.e.); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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cally induced. 7 The result has been that mental diseases which are associated with gradually developing mental or psychological causes are not
compensable.' 8 The question then arises whether the distinctions which
developed under the pre-1971 statute remain valid after the amendment,
or whether the Texas Legislature intended to broaden the category of occupational diseases to include those which are mentally induced.
Since 1971, Texas appellate courts have not faced the question of the
compensability of mentally induced occupational diseases. Commentators
are in disagreement,"9 but the available legislative history of the amendment, 5 the wording of the section itself,' and the few cases decided since
its enactment,"2 reveal an apparent legislative intent to exclude mentally
induced occupational diseases from the act. 3
The contention that the distinction between "accidental injury" and
"occupational disease" has been eliminated," is apparently without merit.
Cases decided since section 20 was amended have continued to recognize
the distinction. Furthermore, there is still a basic statutory distinction
between the two. Article 8306, section 22 provides that when an occupational disease is aggravated by a pre-existing injury or disease, the claimant's recovery shall be reduced by the percentage of the injury attributable
47. There was no provision for mentally induced occupational diseases in the pre-1971
schedule of compensable diseases. See 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 113, §§ 2-9, at 176-80.
Furthermore, occupational disease cases decided by appellate courts under the 1971 amendment to article 8306, section 20 have all concerned physical causes. See Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, 516 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. 1974) (chronic myositis from
working in stooped position); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Ratcliff, 537 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ) (repeatedly pressing knee against sewing machine lever);
Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Hollis,511 S.W.2d 583, 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1974, writ refd n.r.e.) (inhaling toxic substance over 20 years' employment).
48. See Sartwelle, Workmen's Compensation,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J.
183, 187 (1975).
49. Compare Terry, Occupational Disease & Cumulative Injury, 8 TRIAL L.F. 3, 3-4
(April-June 1974) (compensable); 9 Hous. L. REv. 597, 602 (1972) (arguably compensable)
and 3 TEXAs TECH. L. REv. 367, 371 (1972) (possibly compensable) with Sartwelle, Workmen's
Compensation,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 183, 187 (1975) (not compensable)
and Symposium- Workmen's Compensation:A Pandect of the Texas Law, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J.
608, 670-71 (1974) (not compensable).
50. TEX. S.J. 666 (1971); TEX. H.R.J. 5494-96 (1971).
51. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
52. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Shreve, 551 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[lst Dist.] 1977, no writ); Mueller v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 533 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref d n.r.e.); City of Austin v. Johnson, 525 S.W.2d 220, 221 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
53. See Sartwelle, Workmen's Compensation,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J.
183, 187 (1975).
54. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
55. Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Tex. 1972); Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Shreve, 551 S.W.2d 79, 81-82 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1977,
no writ).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 10 [2022], No. 1, Art. 8

1978]

COMMENTS

to the pre-existing injury.5" In the case of accidental injuries, however, the
injury need only be a producing cause, and recovery is not reduced on
account of a pre-existing injury. 7
There also is evidence of a legislative intent to exclude cumulative mental stress from the definition of occupational disease. The repetitive
trauma section of the amendment was apparently taken from the California Labor Code,"8 which defines "cumulative injury" as "repetitive mentally or physically traumatic activities extending over a period of time"
which cause a disability." The original Texas version of the bill, as introduced and passed in the Senate, contained exactly the same wording. 0 The
House of Representatives, however, struck the word "mental" from the bill
and left it as it now reads: damages resulting from "repetitious physical
traumatic activities extending over a period of time and arising in the
course of employment."" The apparent intent of the legislature in deleting
the word "mental" from the act was to avoid the extent to which the
California courts were allowing compensation under their statute. 2 Therefore, cumulative stress, while considered a repetitive traumatic activity, is
regarded as a mental rather than physical traumatic activity, and is not
compensable.
OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Few jurisdictions have extended the concept of workmen's compensation
to include mentally induced occupational diseases. The most controversial example of such cumulative injury is that of a neurosis or anxiety
reaction which is alleged to have been induced by protracted or repetitive
mental stress attributed to job pressures. Among the cases which have
granted such compensation, Carter v. General Motors Corp.4 is the most
notorious. In Carter the Michigan Supreme Court sustained a compensation award for a psychosis resulting from cumulative emotional pressures
suffered on the job by an assembly line worker. 5 The award was sustained
56. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 22 (Vernon 1967).
57. See, e.g., Gill v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 417 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1967, no writ); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Herzik, 359 S.W.2d 914, 918 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Rooth, 268 S.W.2d 539,
542 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1954, writ refd n.r.e.).
58. See Terry, Occupational Disease & Cumulative Injury, 8 TRIAL L.F. 3, 3-4 (AprilJune 1974).
59. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.1 (Deering 1976).
60. TEX. S.J. 666 (1971).
61. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1978); TEX. H.R.J. 5494-96
(1971).
62. See Baker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 96 Cal. Rptr. 279, 285 (Ct. App.
1971); Beveridge v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 346 P.2d 545, 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
63. See 1A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.23, at 7-377 (1973).
64. 106 N.W.2d 105 (Mich. 1960).
65. Id. at 113.
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despite the fact that the employee had considerable emotional difficulties
in his background and that his job involved no extraordinary stress, hazardous condition, or identifiable risk of employment." The court rejected
the contention that a traumatic event should be required in mental disease
cases in order to insure that the disease is work related. 7 California courts
have reached the same result as Carter." In awarding compensation for a
cumulative mental injury, a California Court of Appeals reasoned, "[tihe
more enlightened view, to which we subscribe, does not impose physical
accident or trauma as a precondition of recovery for psychoneurotic injury."" California also holds that the disabling injury may be the result of
each day's stresses and strains. 0
The jurisdictions which allow compensation for mentally induced occupational diseases commonly justify such awards on the ground that no
matter what distinctions are drawn concerning the cause of the injury, the
result nevertheless is a disabled worker.7 Since the chance that workers
will succumb to the pressures of their job is present, then that chance is a
"risk of employment" which should, like accidental injuries, be borne by
industry as a cost of production. 2 Another reason advanced for disposing
66. Id. at 109, 113.
67. Id.at 109, 113.
68. Baker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 96 Cal. Rptr. 279, 285-86 (Ct. App.
1971).
69. Id. at 285; see Firemen's Fund Indem. Co. v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n, 250
P.2d 148, 150 (Cal. 1952); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 175
P.2d 823, 826 (Cal. 1946).
70. Baker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 96 Cal. Rptr. 279, 285 (Ct. App.
1971). In Beveridge v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 346 P.2d 545, 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959),
the court stated:
The fact that a single but slight work strain may not be disabling does not destroy its
causative effect, if in combination with other such strains, it produces a subsequent
disability .... The fragmentation of injury, the splintering of symptoms into small
pieces, the atomization of pain into minor twinges, the piecemeal contribution of workeffort to final collapse, does not negate injury.
71. See, e.g., Baker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 96 Cal. Rptr. 279, 285-86
(Ct. App. 1971); Royal State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Appeal Bd., 487 P.2d
278, 282 (Hawaii 1971); Carter v. General Motors Corp., 106 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Mich. 1960);
Henderson, Should Workmen's CompensationBe Extended to NonoccupationalInjuries?, 48
TEXAS L. Rv. 117, 126-27 (1969).
The emphasis now seems to be on the right of a working man to recover regardless of
the origin of the risk, as long as the employment has some substantial effect on the
conduct or life of the employee when the injury occurs .... The focal point is no
longer the causal connection, but now becomes the disabling injury and its effect not
only on the employee, but also on society.
Id. at 126-27.
72. Royal State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Appeal Bd., 487 P.2d 278,
282 (Hawaii 1971).
In today's highly competitive world it cannot be doubted that people often succumb
to mental pressures resulting from their employment. These disabilities are as much
a cost of the production process as physical injuries. The humanitarian purposes of the
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of the requirement of an "event" causing the injury is that cumulative
stress can produce injuries as serious as those produced by sudden
trauma. 3 The argument that the workman is being compensated for preexisting mental defects which he brought with him to the job is refuted by
reference to the traditional rule in accidental injury cases that the employer must take his employees as he finds them. 4 In Michigan, a subjective standard is used to determine whether the injury in question arose out
of employment, and no consideration is given to the claimant's pre-existing
mental maladies. 5 Thus it is the effect of the work environment as the
employee perceives it'that is considered, and not as it is viewed objectively.
The claimant's perception of the workplace, as altered by pre-existing
disease, may not conform to reality, but if he perceives it to be injurious,
and suffers a mental disability as a result of such perception, his injury is
compensable under the Michigan standard."
Other jurisdictions refuse to allow recovery in cases of nervous injury
brought on by gradual strain and worry. In Lawson v. Employers Insurance
of Wausau," a Federal district court faced the problem directly. The plaintiff suffered a chronic anxiety reaction, and there was testimony that the
disability was caused by the long hours and irregular shifts he was required
to work. The court, applying Tennessee law, denied compensation reasoning that such conditions were not "present in any peculiar or increased
degree by comparison with employment generally" and thus were not a
"risk connected with employment." 8 Similarly, Arizona courts have held
Workmen's Compensation Law require that indemnification be predicated not upon
the label assigned to the injury received, but upon the employee's inability to work
because of impairments flowing from the conditions of his employment.
Id. at 282.
73. See Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards for Psychoneurotic Reactions, 70
YALE L.J. 1129, 1137-38 (1961).
[Tihe reluctance to consider trivial events suggests a mistaken view as to the nature
of precipitating events. The courts apparently believe that the intensity of a stimulus
is related to the likelihood that the stimulus was a cause of the psychoneurotic reaction. Psychiatrists believe that there is either no correlation between the intensity of
the trauma and the resultant neurosis, or that the seriousness of the neurosis varies
inversely with the severity of the triggering event.
Id. at 1138.
74. See Muznik v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Bd., 124 Cal. Rptr. 407, 413 (Ct.
App. 1975); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 166 P.2d 908, 911 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1946); Deziel v. Difco Laboratories, Inc., 232 N.W.2d 146, 152 (Mich. 1975);
34 LA. L. REv. 846, 848 (1974).
75. Deziel v. Difco Laboratories, Inc., 232 N.W.2d 146, 152 (Mich. 1975); Carter v.
General Motors Corp., 106 N.W.2d 105, 113 (Mich. 1960).
76. Deziel v. Difco Laboratories, Inc., 232 N.W.2d 146, 152 (Mich. 1975); Carter v.
General Motors Corp., 106 N.W.2d 105, 113 (Mich. 1960).
77. 330 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).
78. Id. at 323. The court noted that "the implications to business concerns engaging in
shift work by allowing recovery for a psychological malady caused by shift work is great." Id.
at 323. See also Deziel v. Difco Laboratories, Inc., 232 N.W.2d 146, 153 (Mich. 1975) (dissenting opinion).
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that the "gradual buildup of emotional stress over a period of time" is part
of the "usual, ordinary and expected incidents" of employment, and thus
not within their workmen's compensation act.7"
Although a majority of jurisdictions have found neuroses to be compensable injuries,8" most retain the requirement that it be linked to an unexpected accident or event."' This insistence upon an ascertainable event is
no doubt due to the problems of causation involved with untraceable stimuli such as pressure, anxiety, tension, and stress. 2 The event serves a
dual purpose. It raises a distinction between the ordinary stress of life and
the ascertainable stress of employment, thereby allowing categorization of
the ascertainable stress as a risk of employment." The event also provides
a contributing cause upon which the chain of causation from employment
to injury can be constructed. 4

Policy
In the case of mentally induced occupational disease, or more particularly, neuroses resulting from the cumulative stress of employment, the
We also would find that, although the multitudinous forces within a personality may
require a person to seek a way of life gratifying to his or her psyche-the consumer of
a product never was and should not be expected to bear the cost of this gratification
(real though the need must be).
Id. at 153 (dissenting opinion).
79. Muse v. Industrial Comm'n, 554 P.2d 908, 911 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); see Ayer v. Industrial Comm'n, 531 P.2d 208, 211 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975). In Shope v. Industrial Comm'n,
495 P.2d 148, 149-50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972), the court noted that "to grant petitioner his
requested relief would literally open Pandora's Box permitting compensation to any disgruntled employee who leaves his job in a huff because of an emotional disturbance."
80. 1A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.23, at 7-373 (1973) (survey
of case law allowing and refusing compensation); see Hood v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex.
522, 527, 209 S.W.2d 345, 348 (1948), wherein it was noted that "[tiraumatic neuroses
following physical injuries are almost universally compensated ....
81. See Verdugo v. Industrial Comm'n, 561 P.2d 1249, 1250 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); Erhart
v. Great W. Sugar Co., 546 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Mont. 1976); 1A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.23, at 7-373 (1973); Manson, Workmen's Compensation and
the Disabling Neurosis, 11 BUFFALO L. REV. 376, 383-84 (1961-1962).
82. See Sartwelle, Workmen's Compensation, Annual Survey to Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J.
213, 234 (1976); Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards for Psychoneurotic Reactions,
70 YALE L.J. 1129, 1137 (1961); 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 204, 208-10 (1975).
83. See Symposium-Workmen's Compensation: A Pandect of the Texas Law, 6 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 608, 670-71 (1974). The Wisconsin courts have reached an interesting solution.
In School Dist. # 1 v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 215 N.W.2d 373 (Wis.
1974), the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that non-traumatically caused mental injury was
compensable only if it resulted from a situation of greater dimensions than day to day
emotional strain. Accord, Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human
Relations, 240 N.W.2d 128, 131 (Wis. 1976).
84. See Manson, Workmen's Compensationand the Disabling Neurosis, 11 BUFFALO L.
REv. 376, 381 (1961-1962); Comment, Recovery for Mental Injuries Resulting from Mental
Stress Under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 53 CHI-KENT L. REV. 731, 744 (1977); 34 LA.
L. REV. 846, 846-47 (1974).
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issue of causation is a complex one." Since anxiety, tension, and pressure
are characteristic of modern life, difficulty is encountered in attributing a
given neurosis solely to employment related stress. 8 The existence of past
maladjustment and emotional imbalance further complicates the assorted
stimuli until it becomes an arbitrary, if not impossible task to pinpoint the
precise cause of the condition. 7 This may be true even though the claimant's employment is shown to be characterized by stress and overwork
since, "[i]t is more likely that a particular occurrence at work merely
serves as an excuse for an inner conflict to attach to that occurrence .
,,." The issue of causation is even more complex when ordinary
stresses common to all types of employment, and which cause no disabilities in the ordinary employee, are alleged to have caused a particular
compensable neurosis. As one commentator has perceptively noted: "In
85. Comment, Workmen's CompensationAwards for PsychoneuroticReactions, 70 YALE
L.J. 1129, 1142-43 (1961).
[Tihe complex etiology of psychoneurosis and the demands of time for examination
are such that in a substantial number of cases a psychiatrist will be unable to estimate
with any degree of accuracy the probabilities of the injury occurring in the absence of
employment. All major schools of psychoanalytic thought agree that although immediate factors of reality may serve as precipitating or exciting causes, the adult's predisposition towards a psychoneurotic reaction lies in the childhood. . . . Whether a given
experience or combination of experiences will trigger the psychoneurotic potential into
a psychoneurosis will depend on the vulnerability of the individual . . . . In such
cases, the causation requirement . . . is of little assistance in deciding whether to
award compensation.
Id. at 1142-43.
86. Houts, Work Stresses and Compensation, 7 TRAUMA No. 4, at 2 (1965).
87. See Brill & Glass, Workmen's Compensationfor PsychiatricDisorders, 193 J.A.M.A.
345, 346-48 (1965).
88. Manson, Workmen's Compensationand the Disabling Neurosis, 11 BUFFALO L. REv.
376, 386 (1961-1962). It has also been noted that "[1life is characterized by stress, both
interpersonal and intrapsychic. No job is free from stress. It is one thing to provide sickness
insurance that will cover the varied manifestations of disordered emotional states, and it is
another to attribute these states incorrectly to isolated or specific job stresses." Brill & Glass,
Workmen's Compensationfor PsychiatricDisorders, 193 J.A.M.A. 345, 348 (1965).
89. Jurisdictions allowing compensation in such cases are discussed at notes 70-75 supra
and accompanying text. This viewpoint does indeed result in employee health insurance. See
Brill & Glass, Workmen's Compensation for PsychiatricDisorders, 193 J.A.M.A. 345, 345
(1965).
Emotional adjustment is always a function of predisposition. ...
What is stressful for one person may not be stressful for another. If one is to avoid
reductio ad absurdum in formulating any workable concept of causal relationships as
it relates to compensability it is necessary to consider only that stress which is objective
* , I and unusual. Exposure to an affectionate display may result in an emotional
illness in individuals who have by virtue of unresolved conflicts within themselves, an
inability to deal with it. Life itself is characterized by a combination of both objective
and subjective stresses. If illness caused by subjective stress were considered compensable, then all illness of emotional origin could be compensable, since no job is free of
stress and the illness could be attributed to job stress.
Id. at 345.
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those cases where cause-in-fact can neither be proven nor negated, the
decision to grant or deny compensation should depend in large part upon
the court's interpretation of the causation requirement and the policies
behind the workmen's compensation statutes.""9
RECENT DEVELOPMENT

On May 24, 1978, the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals, in Transportation Insurance Co. v. Maskyn," held that an anxiety depression which
the appellee attributed to an accumulation of on the job pressures was not
an ordinary disease of life, but rather was a compensable occupational
disease. 2 The court, in holding that cumulative stress could constitute
an occupational disease, relied primarily on Bailey v. American General
Insurance Co."2 The appellant's attempt to distinguish Bailey on the
ground that it dealt with an accidental injury and not an occupational
disease was summarily rejected.' The court found no reason to distinguish
between a single traumatic experience and a number of such experiences
for the purpose of compensability.15 Such reasoning is no doubt correct in
the context of accidental injury, since in both instances the injury, although purely mental, may be compensable. But the Bailey holding that
a mental stimulus can result in a compensable accidental injury if traceable to a definite time, place, and cause is clearly inapplicable to occupational disease cases involving a series of untraceable mental stimuli."
By its use of Bailey and the accidental injury criteria, and its refusal to
recognize the difference between a cumulative injury and one which arises
at a definite time, place, and cause, the court in Maskyn lends support to
the theory, noted above,9" that such distinction is no longer necessary. If
the decision is allowed to stand, it will go a long way towards abolishing
the distinction, which grew up by way of case law, between accidental
injuries and occupational diseases.
90. Comment, Workmen's CompensationAwards for Psychoneurotic Reactions, 70 YALE
L.J. 1129, 1143 (1961).
91. Transportation Ins. Co. v. Maskyn, No. 15944 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio, May
24, 1978) (not yet reported).
92. Id. at 10-11.
93. Id. at 4-5; see Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955).
94. Transportation Ins. Co. v. Maskyn, No. 19544, slip op. at 5 (Tex.Civ. App.-San
Antonio, May 24, 1978) (not yet reported). "We see very little justification for a holding that
a claimant can recover for a neurosis occasioned by one traumatic experience, but cannot
recover for a similar neurosis caused by a number of such traumatic experiences." Id. at 5.
95. Id. at 5. The court had the benefit of a jury finding that the long hours the claimant
was required to work constituted repetitious physically traumatic activity. Id. at 1. They
nevertheless faced the issue of mental causation since both no evidence and insufficient
evidence points on the issue were raised by the appellants. Id. at 3.
96. See notes 45-48 supra and accompanying text.
97. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

The requirements that the Texas Legislature built into article 8306,
section 20 of the Workers' Compensation Act seem to have been designed
to insure that only work related injuries will be compensated." Both
stresses of employment and stresses of ordinary life create risks that neuroses will occur. As such risks are common to all employment and common
to life in general, the legislature has excluded repetitive mental stress
which accumulates to cause a disability from the definition of occupational
disease.99 It is submitted that such stresses are instead to be considered
"ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed" and thus
excluded from occupational disease compensation.' ° Extraordinary
stresses of employment, on the other hand, are not excluded from compensation under this analysis, even if they are purely mental. This is true
because such stresses, being extraordinary, should be traceable to a definite time, place, and cause, and would thus qualify as accidental injuries.' 9 It appears, then, that the Texas Legislature, conscious of the fact
98. See Mueller v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 533 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (evidence failed to establish that cumulative strain caused heart
attack; not traceable to definite time, place, and cause); City of Austin v. Johnson, 525
S.W.2d 220, 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ refd n.r.e.) (in heart attack case,
worry and anxiety over possible job loss not related to contract of employment).
In the heart attack cases, proof that the injury was in fact related to employment is on
the same nebulous footing as in neurosis cases. Texas courts have required proof of an accidental, rather than cumulative injury before awarding compensation for heart attacks. The
causal connection between employment and injury in such cases is proved by a showing of
strain and overexertion in the course of employment. Pan Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Reed, 436
S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Henderson v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 544 S.W.2d 649, 650-51 (Tex. 1976); O'Dell v. Home Indem. Co., 449 S.W.2d 485,
487 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
99. Amended article 8306, section 20 speaks directly to cumulative injury. TEx. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1978). Certainly the legislature was aware of
the fact that cumulative mental injuries were not compensable under prior law. See 1947
TEx. GEN. LAWS, ch. 113, §§ 2-9, at 176-80. They also must have been aware of the trend
toward recovery in the repetitive mental trauma cases. See notes 59-71 supra and accompanying text. Since the word "mental" was excluded from the phrase "repetitious physically
traumatic activity" in section 20, the conclusion is inescapable that the legislature intended
to exclude cumulative mental stress from the occupational disease definition. See TEx. S.J.
666 (1971); TEX. H.R.J. 5494-96 (1971).
100. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1978). See the suggestion
in Sartwelle, Workmen's Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 259, 275
(1977), that the "principal component" of the definition of occupational disease contained
in the statute is the ordinary disease of life exclusion. The note goes on to point out that the
phrase is not one of effortless application. Id. at 275-76; see 1A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 41.33, at 7-267 (1973).
101. See notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text. A definite time, place, and cause may
be found though the "accidents" occur over a period of several days. See Texas Employers'
Ins. Ass'n v. Murphy, 506 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no
writ) (accidental injury from inhaling harmful fumes over three days).
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that workers' compensation is not health insurance, and that the function
of the causation requirement is to limit the employer's liability to those
cases where the injury has a clear relationship to employment, has designed a statutory test that all occupational diseases must meet.
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